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"Man is not infallible...He can never be absolutely certain that his inquiries were not misled
and that what he considers is certain truth is not error. All that man can do is to submit all
his theories again and again to the most critical reexamination" (Mises)
“The real linchpin of my thought about human knowledge is fallibilism and the critical
approach” (Popper).
“If a priori structures exist independent of the mind, then we have no good cause to expect
that our knowledge of such structures will in every case have that sort of absolute
evidence with which the Kantian a priori is normally associated. It thereby becomes
possible to conceive a doctrine of what we might call fallibilistic apriorism” (Smith).
This paper argues that the best way to develop the economics of von Mises is along the
lines of “fallible apriorism” rather than the strong program of apriorism advocated by
Rothbard and his followers. This position is supported by Popper’s epistemology which
can be described as “conjectural apriorism”. Barry Smith presented his views as a part of
the Aristotelian framework that he detected in Menger’s work. This framework is practically
identical to the “metaphysical research program” that Popper developed in dialogue with
the physicists.
The outcome of the Popper/Smith program is a form of methodological monism that
supports the main lines of the causal realist program initiated by Carl Menger.
Outline of the Argument
Salerno (2010) identified a movement in economics called “causal realism”, which was
initiated by Menger and taken up by others including Clark, Fetter, Davenport, Wicksteed
and Wicksell. The aim of causal realism is to find causal “exact laws” to account for cause
and affect relationships between economic phenomena involving real markets, real people
and real time. Salerno argued that Mises delivered major advances in epistemology and
methodology, especially by refining the a priori approach. On Salerno’s account Rothbard
was inspired by Mises to pursue the a priori method, not as a radical innovation but to
recover the almost lost tradition of causal realism. 
Causal realism is quite likely invaluable as an approach to all sciences, natural and
human, but Mises left an ambiguous legacy with a mix of justificationism (strong apriorism)
and the critical approach (critical rationalism). I will argue that the justificationist element
that Rothbard took up is not essential to causal realism and is instead an impediment in
two ways; first, to intellectual progress, because the method cannot deliver on its
foundationalist claims; and second, to advancing good economics in the profession,
because scholars in other schools are extremely reluctant to accept that strong apriorism
is a legitimate method.
 
The purpose of apriorism for Mises and his followers is to distance economics from the
natural sciences which are assumed to pursue the methods of empiricism and positivism. 
"The modern natural sciences owe their success to the method of observation and
experiment. There is no doubt that empiricism and pragmatism are right as far as they
merely describe the procedures of the natural sciences." (Human Action p. 32). Following
the work of Popper it is apparent that empiricism, positivism and inductivism cannot
account for the success of the natural sciences, so the project of methodological dualism
is rendered problematic. To succeed, it will be necessary to provide new arguments to
demonstrate that the human sciences cannot use the same logic of investigation and
appraisal of theories that is practiced in physics. In the meantime economists and social
scientists can be challenged to modify their approach in the Austrian/causal realist
direction by an appeal to the methods of the natural sciences, as expounded by Karl
Popper in his critique of positivism and logical empiricism.
Strong apriorism from Mises to Rothbard to Hoppe.
The main lines of Mises’ apriorism are well known, though the element of tension between
his critical attitude and his strong apriorism is not usually noted.  The strong form of
apriorism is apparent in his comparison with geometry, with all of the theorems implied in
the axioms. Hence all the theorems of monetary theory are already implied in the concept
of money and "The quantity theory does not add to our knowledge anything that is which
is not virtually contained in the concept of money" (Human Action, p. 38).
"The starting point of praxeology is not a choice of axioms and a decision about methods
of procedure, but reflection about the essence of action…” (Human Action, p. 39)
"From the unshakeable foundation of the category of human action praxeology and
economics proceed step by step by means of discursive reasoning. …Precisely defining
assumptions and conditions, they construct a system of concepts and draw all the
inferences implied by logically unassailable ratiocination." (Human Action, p. 67)
Rothbard (1976) took the same stance.
“The fundamental axiom that individual human beings act, that is, on the primordial fact
that individuals engage in conscious action towards chosen goals [in contrast with reflex
or knee-jerk behaviour], furthermore, since praxeology begins with a true axiom, A, all the
propositions that can be deduced from this axiom must also be true. For if A implies B,
and A is true, then B must also be true.”
He asserted that these propositions are justified because they are deduced from the
axiom of purposeful action.
“Apart from the fact that these conclusions cannot be tested by historical or statistical
means, there is no need to test them since their truth has already been established.”
Hoppe (1995) went further to elaborate the philosophical underpinnings and to emphasize
that the appropriate foundation is all-important.
“How do we find such axioms? Kant answers, by reflecting upon ourselves, by
understanding ourselves as knowing subjects. And this fact - that the truth of a priori
synthetic propositions derives ultimately from inner, reflectively produced experience - also
explains why such propositions can possibly have the status of being understood as
necessarily true. Observational experience can only reveal things as they happen to be;
there is nothing in it that indicates why things must be the way they are. Contrary to this,
however, writes Kant, our reason can understand such things as being necessarily the
way they are” (1995, p. 8).
Thus it is claimed that economic propositions flow directly from our reflectively gained
knowledge of action; and the foundational status of these propositions, the justification for
our confidence in their truth, derives from the axiom of action.
“It cannot be denied that this proposition is true, since the denial would have to be
categorized as an action - and so the truth of the statement literally cannot be undone.”
(ibid, p. 10).
“All of these categories - values, ends, means, choice, preference, cost, profit  and loss,
as well as time and causality - are implied in the axiom of action.” (ibid, p. 10)
“Provided there is no flaw in the process of deduction, the conclusions that such reasoning
yield must be valid a priori because their validity would ultimately go back to nothing but
the indisputable axiom of action…Such is the idea of economics as praxeology. And such
then is the ultimate disagreement that Austrians have with their colleagues. Their
pronouncements cannot be deduced from the axiom of action or even stand in clear-cut
contradiction to propositions that can be deduced from the axiom of action. And even if
there is agreement on the identification of facts and the assessment of certain events as
being related to each other as causes and consequences, this agreement is superficial.
For such economists falsely believe their statements to be empirically well-tested
propositions when they are, in fact, propositions that are true a priori.” (ibid. p. 11, my
italics).
This is a nice example of the doctrine of justification of propositions by the method of
discovery (sometimes called the genetic fallacy), rather than assessing propositions on
the basis of  their  performance, or simply their truth. This topic is taken up below in the
Discussion. 
Smith’s critique 
Smith’s 1996 critique of “foundational apriorism” is included in this collection of papers.
The background is the Aristotelian framework which informed Austrian philosophy and
Menger’s economics (Smith, 1994 and 1996). Only the conclusions of the 1996 paper
need to be noted here.
“If we wish to hold on to the view that all the propositions of praxeology are analytic in this
sense, however, then we shall have to insist that the whole of praxeology can be erected
on the basis of premises involving at most one single primitive non-logical concept”. 
However there is “a veritable plenitude” of non-logical primitive concepts that turn out to
be packed into the axiom of action.
“Certainly some of the concepts involved…may reasonably be counted as logical
concepts; others may no less reasonably be conceived as being introduced by definitions
formulated in terms of other, more primitive concepts. Consider, however, the concepts
causation, relative satisfactoriness, reason, uneasiness, valuation, anticipation, means,
ends, utilization, time, scarcity, opportunity, choice, uncertainty, expectation, etc. The idea
that one could simultaneously and without circularity reduce every one of the concepts in
this family to the single concept of action, that they could all be defined by purely logical
means in terms of this one single concept, is decisively to be rejected.”
“The most worrying feature of Hoppe’s account is indeed that many of the most central
propositions of praxeology itself will fall outside the scope of the synthetic a priori as he
conceives it. ‘All the categories-values, ends, means, choice, preference, cost, profit and
loss, as well as time and causality-are,’ he tells us, ‘implied in the axiom of action’. But
how is this “implied” to be understood? As Hoppe correctly recognizes, it is not a matter of
logical implication. Rather, he seems to argue, it is to be understood as follows: that any
denial of a proposition for example relating preference to cost must be self-refuting. Let us
suppose that this is true. Do we know that it is true because of what we know about the
special action of denial, as Hoppe seems to suggest?”
“Or do we know that it is true because of what we know about preference and cost?
Surely at least in part because of the latter; but then the appeal to actions of denial in the
explication of a priori economic knowledge is at best insufficient, and at worst redundant.” 
Tokumaru’s critique of the a priori
Tokumaru (2009) took up the claim that the theoretical social sciences can be based on
the "category of human action". She identified four possible formulations.
1. The category of action is an observational statement or a statement describing
experiences from introspection.
She suggests that Mises could have used singular observation statements (about the way
that people evaluate situations and then act) as an empirical base to postulate social
regularities by generalization. So he might have used a principle of induction (like the one
he relied on in his account of the natural sciences) to make the leap from correct
observations of individual instances of human action, to the universal statement of the
action axiom.
The logical steps run:
First, premises in the form of singular statements in the form ‘At time t and location k there
is a human who acts rationally to achieve an aim’.
Second, the fundamental proposition of regularity (principle of induction) ‘What is correctly
observed in one case must also be observed in all other cases offering the same
conditions.’
Conclusion (a strictly universal statement) ‘All humans act rationally to achieve aims’.
Tokamaru points out that this approach makes the axiom hostage to the inductive principle
and hence not valid a priori.
2. The category of action is a proposition about the basic ontological form of the
social universe, describing its essential characteristics.
In this formulation “Praxeological reality is not the physical universe, but man’s conscious
reaction to the given state of this universe” (Human Action, p 92).
And “We do not want to discover a new method, but only to characterize correctly the
method that is actually used in economics” (Mises, 1933, p. 18)
The deduction runs as follows:
Premise 1. Social knowledge exists (social knowledge is possible).
Premise 2. If social knowledge exists, humans exist who act rationally.
Conclusion. Humans exist who act rationally (there exists human action).
This line of argument depends on the validity of Premise 1 in all circumstances, meaning
that it has to assume the status of a synthetic a priori, which begs the question of its own
justification and thus leads to an infinite regress.
3. The category of action is a definition, adopted as a convention.
Indeed, Mises stated that “Action is, by definition, always rational” (1933, p. 3)
On this account the theorems of economics would be tautologies on a par with
mathematics and logic, with all the content contained in the initial definitions. Clearly
Mises thought along this line some of the time, (when he compared monetary theory to
geometry) and the same may be claimed for the axiom of action.
Tokumaru’s critique of this approach plays on the incompatibility of the claim that the
theorems of praxeology are both true a priori (and so are incapable of being refuted by
any experience) and also convey precise knowledge of the real world.
On Tokumaru’s account Mises resorted to pragmatic or instrumental arguments to explain
the nature of  descriptive theories which are definitions. She concludes that if Mises took
this option he would have to settle for usefulness instead of  truth as the criterion for
acceptance of economic theorems. This is a position that can be defended but it is very
different from the claims of Rothbard and Hoppe.
4. The category of action is a methodological principle, of the kind required by
methodological individualism.
This is entirely consistent with Mises’ aims, his principles and his practice. However
methodological principles are normally regarded as conventions, to be accepted or
rejected on the basis of their utility in advancing work to generate true descriptions and
explanations of phenomena. Questions of truth and falsehood can arise, for example
methodological individualism may be supported by refuting claims about group minds or
the spirit of the age, however methodological principles cannot be claimed to be a priori
truths.
Tokumaru concludes that none of the four formulations of the category of action justify
claims to a priori truth.
Smith on "Fallible Apriorism" 
Smith’s explanation of fallible apriorism demonstrates the direction that the thoughts of
Mises can be developed by following the critical position that he sometimes articulated.
Smith drew a distinction between two forms  of apriorism that he called impositionist and
reflectionist (1990, section 5). 
For the impositionist a priori knowledge is possible because it reflects forms and
structures which the mind itself imposed or inscribed on the world. On this account we can
obtain no direct knowledge of reality itself from outside, rather, our knowledge is a product
of the logical structures of our mind (which is apparently the same as all the other minds). 
"On the other hand are reflectionist views, which hold that we can have a priori knowledge
of what exists, independently of all impositions or inscriptions of the mind, as a result of
the fact that certain structures in the world enjoy some degree of intelligibility in their own
right. The knowing subject and the objects of knowledge are for the reflectionist in some
sense and to some degree pre-tuned to each other.” (ibid).
The process of pre-tuning is not specified but in any case it cannot be assumed that the
tuning is perfect, so our knowledge is fallible and is liable to be refuted and (possibly)
corrected by interaction with the outside world. The fallible apriorist will suppose that there
are true propositions “and that science strives to accumulate ever more of these: we do
not however affirm that we know (or much less that we have certain knowledge about)
which of the available candidates for such propositions are true among those which at any
given time play a role in the really existing sciences”. (ibid).
He explained that the fallibilistic doctrine of a priori laws provides a solution to the
longstanding problem for proponents of the a priori, that is, how to make a choice between
competing systems which all claim to have a priori foundations. This situation is hardly
conceivable for those with non-fallibilistic theories based on one or other of the
foundational epistemologies. Popper used the term “manifest truth” theories to describe
schools of thought which presume that the truth is manifest if the appropriate method is
used. He also suggested that one of the consequences of such a position is the
“conspiracy theory of ignorance” which attributes intellectual error to a process of
deliberate deception by other people  for ulterior motives( Popper, 1963, pp. 7-8 ). 
“On the conception here defended, in contrast, the existence of such rival systems can be
seen to be a perfectly natural and acceptable consequence of the just-mentioned
difficulties we will often in fact face in coming to know even the intelligible traits of reality.
One adjudicates between such systems in the same way, then, in which one adjudicates
between all rival scientific hypotheses, namely via a complex mixture of empirical and a
priori [logical] considerations.” (Smith, 1996).
Re-reading Popper 
This brings us to the parallels between Smith and Popper on epistemology and the
metaphysical and ontological framework. Popper can be described as a fallible or
conjectural apriorist and the metaphysical framework that he formulated in his debate with
the physicists is practically identical to the Aristotelian framework that Smith found in
Menger (Smith, 1990, 1994, 1996).
The standard reading of Popper’s philosophy of science as “falsificationism” obscures
most of the important features of his work, and especially the Austrian-Aristotelian
elements. Re-reading of Popper is required to correct the errors that are propagated in the
literature. Dozens of books describe Popper as a kind of positivist, partly because he
persisted in critical dialogue with them [Footnote 1].  The textbook presentation of the
philosophy of science typically begins with inductivism, then explains that Popper
substituted falsification for  verification, then some problems with “falsificationism” are
identified, without reference to Popper’s counter-arguments, and he is put aside in favour
of Lakatos, or Kuhn or some other more position (Chalmers, 1976; Hausman, 1992;
Papineau, 1998).
Chalmers is a particularly persuasive and influential exponent of this approach. He used
the following definition of falsificationism “Theories can be conclusively falsified in the light
of suitable evidence…Theory rejection can be decisive. This is the factor that earns
falsificationists their title” (Chalmers, 1975, p 57). Popper is the target but Popper wrote “In
point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced”, for various
reasons, including the Duhem problem, (Popper, 1959, p 50.)  Clearly, Popper is not a
falsificationist on that definition and close reading of a multitude of texts reveals that faults
generally lie not with Popper’s position but with misrepresentations of it [Note 2].
To make the connection with apriorism, Popper can be read as a modified Kantian. This is
how he described his agreement with Kant and how he modified Kant’s position (Popper,
1963, pp 190-192).
“Kant, like almost all philosophers and epistemologists right into the twentieth century, was
convinced that Newton’s theory was true….But how to overcome the problem identified by
Hume, that by way of our senses we have no direct access to the laws of nature, just to
the appearances?”
“Kant’s solution of the problem is well known. He assumed, correctly I think, that the world
as we know it is our interpretation of the observable facts in the light of theories that we
ourselves invent. As Kant puts it: ‘Our intellect does not draw its laws from nature … but
imposes them upon nature.’”
“I should therefore like to put it in the following modified form: ‘Our intellect does not draw
its laws from nature, but tries – with varying degrees of success – to impose upon nature
laws which it freely invents.’”
“The difference is this. Kant’s formulation not only implies that our reason attempts to
impose laws upon nature, but also that it is invariably successful in this…Since Kant
believed that it was our task to explain the uniqueness and the truth of Newton’s theory, he
was led to the belief that this theory followed inescapably and with logical necessity from
the laws of our understanding. The modification of Kant’s solution which I propose, in
accordance with the Einsteinian revolution, frees us, from this compulsion. In this way,
theories are seen to be the free creations of our own minds, the result of an almost poetic
intuition, of an attempt to understand intuitively the laws of nature. But we no longer try to
force our creations upon nature. On the contrary, we question nature, as Kant taught us to
do.”        
The decisive step for Popper was a full-blooded “conjectural turn”, to claim that even our
best theories may be rendered problematic by new evidence, new criticisms and new
theories. This anticipated the “hermeneutic turn” when appreciation of the theory-
dependence of observations became more widespread in the wake of Kuhn and the
modern French theorists. 
To understand Popper it is necessary to take on board the “conjectural turn” which dates
from 1935 with the original German version of The Logic of  Scientific Discovery and some
other moves as well. These include the “objectivist turn” to break with the obsession with
the justification of beliefs and instead to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of 
theories that are stated in a public, inter-subjective or “objective” form. Then there is
Popper’s “social turn” to examine the function of institutions, traditions, conventions and
“rules of the game” in science and society (Jarvie, 2000). And the “metaphysical turn” to
the Aristotelian concept of  “a world of propensities” that clearly connects with the
framework which Smith identified in Menger’s economics. (Smith, 1990 and 1994; Popper,
1982, especially the Metaphysical Epilogue) [Note 3].
It will help to explain more about each of these “turns”, starting with the turn to conjectural
objective knowledge. In traditional epistemology the central concern was (and remains)
the justification of beliefs (Grayling, 1998). In “Epistemology without a knowing subject”
Popper wrote 
“This [traditional approach] has led students of epistemology into irrelevancies: while
intending to study scientific knowledge, they studied in fact something which is of no
relevance to scientific knowledge. For scientific knowledge simply is not knowledge in the
sense of the ordinary usage of the words ‘I know’.  While knowledge in the senses of ‘I
know’ belongs to what I call the ‘second world’, the world of subjects, scientific knowledge
belongs to the third world, to the world of objective theories, objective problems and
objective arguments…Thus my first thesis is that the traditional epistemology, of Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, and even of Russell, is irrelevant, in a pretty strict sense of the word. It is
a corollary of this thesis that a large part of contemporary epistemology is irrelevant also.”
(Popper, 1972, p.108).
In the course of explaining Popper’s turn from “justificationism” to critical rationalism,
Bartley pointed out that all attempts to justify beliefs end up in an infinite regress (Bartley,
1964 and 1984 in the Appendices to the revised edition). The alternative to the quest for
justified beliefs is to form tentative critical preferences for theories (or policies) on the
basis of their capacity to solve their problems and stand up to various forms of criticism,
including experimental and practical tests.
Moving on to the “social turn”, the discovery of the social factor in science studies is often
attributed to Kuhn and the sociologists of knowledge, however Jarvie identified what he
called the social turn in Popper’s earliest published work (Jarvie, 2000). In the way that
Hayek wrote about the constitution of liberty, Jarvie found in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery the framework for a “constitution for science”, that is, a set of conventions or
rules to ensure that theories are exposed to criticism, especially empirical tests. Popper’s
focus on the institutional framework of science is explicit in the chapter on the sociology of
knowledge in The Open Society and its Enemies and in the final sections of The Poverty
of Historicism on situational logic and the institutional theory of progress.
“Beyond this logic of situations, or perhaps as a part of it, we need something like an
analysis of social movements. We need studies, based on methodological individualism,
of the social institutions through which ideas may spread and captivate individuals, of the
way in which new traditions may be created, and of the way in which traditions work and
break down. In other words, our individualistic and institutionalist models of such collective
entities as nations, or governments, or markets, will have to be supplemented by models
of political situations as well as of social movements such as scientific and industrial
progress. (A sketch of such an analysis of progress will be found in the next section.)”
(Popper, 1957, p. 149).
Finally, the little-noticed metaphysical turn, possibly the most striking difference between
the later Popper and the original logical positivists, whose signature idea was to render all
talk of metaphysics strictly meaningless. Popper briefly mentioned the theory of
metaphysical research programs in the autobiography written for the Library of Living
Philosophers (Popper 1974, and 1976) but it was several years before it appeared in more
detail in the Metaphysical Epilogue to the third volume of The Postscript to the Logic of
Scientific Discovery. 
“In almost every phase of the development of science we are under the sway of
metaphysical - that is, untestable - ideas; ideas which not only determine what problems
of explanation we shall choose to attack, but also what kinds of answers we shall consider
as fitting or satisfactory or acceptable, and as improvements of, or advances on, earlier
answers. By raising the problems of explanation, which the theory is designed to solve,
the metaphysical research programme makes it possible to judge the success of the
theory as an explanation...These programmes are only occasionally discussed as such:
more often, they are implicit in the theories and in the attitudes and judgments of the
scientists.” (Popper, 1982, p. 161).
This approach has some points of similarity with Kuhn’s paradigm theory but Popper’s
intention was to promote conscious and critical appraisal of the elements of rival programs
instead of accepting uncritically the framework of the school of thought where the student
is trained. Popper’s theory pre-dated Lakatos’s exposition of  the methodology of scientific
research programs but due to the delay in publication by Popper, the ideas of Lakatos
inspired a generation of researchers in a debate over the rival merits of MSRP and 
paradigm theory.   For Lakatos the “hard core” was not supposed to be subjected to
criticism: this is a point of agreement with paradigm theory and it is the crucial point of
disagreement with Popper’s approach to the “core” of research programs.
Two points need to be made about Popper’s theory of metaphysical research programs.
First, it may be that the most distinctive elements of the Austrian program are at the level
of philosophical or metaphysical presuppositions and  these cannot be satisfactorily
debated with the members of other schools where the anti-metaphysical background of
positivism has rendered the presuppositions invisible or beyond rational discussion. 
Second, at the level of details, there is almost point for point agreement between the
presuppositions of Poppers program and the Aristotelian ontology that Smith found at the
core of Menger’s economics. 
                                                                                                                                               
                The outcome of all these Popperian “turns” is support for Smith’s “fallible
apriorism” and for the Rothbardian program of causal realism, the quest for ‘exact laws',
which are universal and explain economic phenomena such that wherever certain "initial
conditions" apply, certain effects will follow.  This is precisely the mode of explanation in
the natural sciences, though in complex (realistic) situations the laws will predict
tendencies rather than precise outcomes due to the multiplicity of factors at work and the
impossibility of getting a full account of the initial conditions. More precision can be
obtained in stable and isolated systems like the solar system and experimental models
(Popper 1957, sections 27 to 29). 
On  this reading of Popper there are many points of contact between Mises and Popper,
as indicated by Di Iorio (2008)
“…the primacy of theory compared to experience; the anti-instrumentalist or realist
conception of science; the fact that empirical theories rest on non-empirical
presuppositions…methodological individualism; the criticism of scientism, inductivism and
holism in social sciences “
Discussion
It is important to note the pervasive influence and durability of presuppositions and
framework assumptions that are shared by schools of thought that are rivals in other
respects. Such is the case with the epistemological doctrine of justification of belief on the
basis of sources or methods of discovery and proof. A classical case is the rivalry between
empiricism and classical rationalism (or intellectualism), between the evidence of the
senses and the intuition of clear and distinct ideas. 
Newton looked like the game-breaker for the empiricists (“I feign no hypothesis”) and it
was widely accepted that the inductive method had decisively proved itself. Consequently
science became Science. Where previously  the term ”science” was applied to any body
of organised information, and to be “scientific” was to be systematic in pursuit of any
activity from angling to archeology, now Science and the Inductive Method set new
standards of excellence in intellectual endeavours. 
One result was a kind of “cargo cult” mentality, with scientists copying those “inductive”
activities which are supposed to deliver scientific results. This is a reference to the cargo
cults of Melanesia after WW2 when the natives who had seen aircraft loaded with goods
arrive at landing strips carved out of the jungle, would copy the actions of the visitors as
best they could  in the hope that more cargo would arrive. So for some years in the 1970s
every secondary school student in the Australian state of New South Wales could read in
the prescribed textbook “Science advances in a definite pattern. First and foremost
scientists must make observations. These observations must be careful and accurate; and
the results of more and more observations accumulate”.
Hume introduced serious doubts about induction but this had little effect on working
scientists.  In contrast, there were major implications among philosophers and so the
empiricists set off on the long march to save inductive logic and Kant responded in a very
different way, as we have seen. In each case the objective is to justify some kind of
foundational source that authenticates the product, ideally a warrant of certainty, but failing
that something as close as possible, in the case of the inductivists this is a numerical
probability value. 
In this situation a theory of conjectural knowledge is not regarded as a genuine or serious
theory of knowledge at all. However the stance articulated by Smith and Popper is entirely
appropriate for working scientists because it directs attention “out the window” to the
phenomena that we want to understand and the problems that we are trying to solve. In
place of a warrant issued by an authority, there will be “critical preferences” based on
multiple criteria: the capacity of the theory to solve the problem; its capacity to stand up to
criticism, especially the tests of  evidence and practical application; the ability of the theory
to integrate different areas of investigation and to inspire productive research programs.
For the benefit of economists who are interested in the programmatic implications of
Popper’s ideas, Boland has sketched a four-point Popper-Hayek program in Chapter 15 of
The Foundations of Economic Method (Boland, 2003). The elements of the program are
(1) Anti-justificationism, (2) Anti-psychologism, (3) Rational decision-making (according to
the logic of the situation) and (4) Situational dynamics (behavior can change as a result of
learning as well as from changes in the situation).
Conclusions
Following Popper, it seems that the methods of the natural sciences cannot usefully be
regarded as positivism or empiricism. They are closer to the Aristotelian, causal realist
position expounded by Barry Smith in his exegesis of Menger’s economics. This means
that people doing good economics can simply claim that the best argument for a theory is
its capacity to provide explanations and understanding of economic phenomena, and to
stand up to various forms of criticism. Austrians do not need to insist that the validity of
their economics depends on a special method which is quite different from the methods of
the natural sciences. And it can be argued that those economists who are trying to
emulate the methods of positivism and empiricism are on the wrong track, but not for the
reasons claimed by the Austrians who advocate strong apriorism.
NOTES
The quotes at the beginning come from Human Action, page 68, from Realism and the
Aim of Science, page xxxv and from Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano,
page 333.
Note 1.  In contrast to Popper’s lifelong dialogue with the positivists, he refused to be
drawn into arguments with the various schools of  “linguistic philosophy’, citing an old
saying “when your enemy is drowning in a swamp, you do not jump in with a knife to stab
him”. 
Note 2.  Chalmers repeated the same definition in the 1982 edition of the book and in the
1999 edition it is revised but the text still conveys the misleading impression that Popper’s
position is fundamentally defective. This book is probably the most widely read
introductory text in the field and it has been translated into several foreign languages. That
critique of Popper has apparently become canonical and it was repeated recently by
McGrew et al “There can, therefore, be no such decisive refutation of a theory as Popper
suggests” (McGrew et al, 2009, p 461.) 
Another example is Hausman (1984, 1994, 2008), writing on the philosophy of economics.
He claimed that a problem with Popper’s falsificationism was the notion that an apparently
falsified theory should be dropped forthwith (with no excuses). This claim stood from 1984
in the first edition to 2008 in the third edition. In fact, Popper wrote “I have always stressed
the need for some dogmatism: the dogmatic scientist has an important role to play. If we
give in to criticism too easily we will never find where the real power of our theories lies”
(Popper, 1974, p. 55). 
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